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Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts: 
Understanding Cattle Rustling in
Northern Nigeria 
Azeez Olaniyan and Aliyu Yahaya 
Abstract: Cattle rustlings have become a major crime in Nigeria recently, 
with the northern region being the hardest hit. In the past few years, rus-
tling activities have resulted in the theft of a huge number of cows, 
deaths of people and destruction of property. Daily reports across the 
northern region have confirmed that cattle rustlings have significantly 
contributed to the increasing security challenges facing the Nigerian state 
and seem to have become big business involving the herders, big-time 
syndicates, and heavily armed bandits. However, despite the growing 
level of cattle rustling and its consequences for society, the situation has 
yet to receive adequate scholarly interrogation. This paper investigates 
the causes and consequences of, and state responses to cattle rustling in 
Nigeria. 
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Cattle rustling has recently become a major internal security concern in 
Nigeria, with the country’s northern region as the epicentre. Reports of 
bandits with automatic weapons storming herders’ settlements and farms 
with the mission of killing people and pillaging cows proliferate. According 
to Ahmadu Suleiman, chairman of the Kaduna State chapter of the Miyetti 
Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, between October 2013 and 
March 2014 approximately 7,000 cattle were rustled from commercial 
livestock farms and traditional herders in Northern Nigeria (Bashir 2014). 
Aminu Bello Masari, the governor of Katsina State, announced the recov-
ery of 30,000 cattle from rustlers within a few months of setting up a joint 
military operation against the menace (Tauna 2016). In most cases, the 
rustlers kill and maim their herders and rape the women before dispos-
sessing them of their cows (Akowe and Kayode 2014); in some instances, 
they also kidnap girls or women in the process (Adeniyi 2015; Yusuf 2015).  
Virtually all of the states in the northern region of Nigeria are af-
fected by cattle rustling. In Plateau State, cattle-rustling activities are 
prevalent in eight (Mangu, Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Shendam, Jos South, 
Riyom, Langtang North, and Langtang South) out of the 17 local gov-
ernment areas (Abimaje 2014; Yusufu 2014). Tony Akowe and Bodunrin 
Kayode (2014) reported that several villages in the areas lying between 
the four northern states of Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, and Niger have 
been under siege from cattle rustlers who freely unleash terror on hapless 
herders and cow farmers. The Special Task Force (STF) set up by the 
Nigerian security forces in response to the security challenges in Jos, 
Plateau State, confirmed that within a period of six months 160 attacks 
by gunmen resulted in 2,501 cows being rustled and 260 people losing 
their lives. In most cases, the rustlers wore military-style camouflaged 
uniforms and showed considerable experience in herding; in some in-
stances, cattle were “kidnapped,” with the rustlers asking for money 
afterwards (Adeniyi 2015). Although cattle rustling has been rampant in 
the rural areas of Northern Nigeria, it not only poses serious security 
challenges at the specific sites of conflict but also threatens to engulf 
places outside of the rural sector and Northern Nigeria.  
The literature on cattle rustling and the violent conflict linked to it 
has consistently been growing in other parts of Africa (Kaimba et al. 
2011; Nganga 2012; Schilling et al. 2012; Greiner 2013). In Nigeria, how-
ever, apart from studies focusing on clashes between herders and farm-
ing communities (such as Ofuoku and Isifie 2009; Okoli and Atelhe 
2014; Blench 2003; Olaniyan and Okeke-Uzodike 2015), predatory cattle 
rustling has yet to receive adequate scholarly attention. The few attempts 
to address this issue, commendable as they are, suffer either from being 
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essentially descriptive in nature (Kwaja 2014) or because their insights and 
implications derive principally from the East African experience (Okoli 
and Okpaleke 2014). Nevertheless, as is the case elsewhere, the contem-
porary spate of violence and the destructive aftermath linked to cattle 
rustling begs for attention. The present study seeks to understand the 
contours, trends, and trajectory of cattle rustling in Northern Nigeria and 
how the state has responded to the threat it poses.  
Theoretical Setting 
The literature on cattle rustling has been dominated by scholars from East 
Africa, largely due to the peculiarity of the problem to the area. The inci-
dence of cattle rustling – in its present, violent form – is a recent devel-
opment in Nigeria. The growing level of literature on the phenomenon 
indicates a growing problem across Africa, with devastating consequences 
outside of its locality. It has become a major source of concern, due not 
only to its implications on the size of the herd and the suffering it gener-
ates, but also to the threat it poses to the very survival of state institutions 
in the places where it occurs. While still primarily a rural-sector activity, 
where the capacity of state institutions to effectively mediate competing 
demands are threatened, relatively weak, or non-existent, the interjection 
of modern destructive weapons and extreme violence accompanying cattle 
theft signify its transition from mere cattle raiding into a ruthless, 
weaponised, highly organised, profit-oriented, translocational and trans-
national consortium. The extreme violence associated with cattle rustling 
has assumed an unimaginable dimension, with murder, rape, human dis-
placement, the burning of entire community settlements and the destruc-
tion of livelihoods, among other horrors, heavily lacing the process. The 
spread of the phenomenon into other parts of the continent has elicited a 
variety of explanatory models that could suitably be examined in the con-
text of distinct but interrelated phases. 
The explanatory model that was most prevalent prior to the 1990s 
associated cattle theft with pastoralists’ cultural traditions or with the 
effects of ecology on pastoralism. At this time, cattle raiding was rela-
tively localised, seasonal, and pursued with mostly traditional weapons, 
and there was a low level of violence associated with it. Although raiding 
appeared lawless, it was governed by some sort of acceptable customary 
rules of engagement among the pastoralists groups involved (Triche 
2014). The literature attributing the phenomenon to issues of culture 
linked raiding with the pastoralists’ cultural imagery of bravery and war-
rior tradition, generational contests, or an unforgiving, revenge-seeking 
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venture (Katsuyoshi and Turton 1979; Nganga 2012). Some of the litera-
ture argued that the foundation of cattle rustling was based on the notion 
of either scarcity of pastureland and water and the incessant struggle over 
access to rapidly depleting resources, resulting in conflicts with similarly 
interested groups (Markakis 1998), or the imbalance of the ecosystem aris-
ing from natural calamities such as droughts, diseases, and the like, leading 
to loss of cattle and motivating the desire to restock lost herd through 
raiding (Toulmin 1995). Livestock theft was not yet informed by the logic 
of the market; rather, stolen stock was mainly redistributed, used to pay 
bride prices, and by tradition, raiding prowess is regarded a rite of passage 
to manhood within pastoralist communities (Fleisher 2002). 
The 1990s witnessed a shift in emphasis as the explanatory model 
that emerged from the literature identified the intrusion and the prolifer-
ation of modern, sophisticated weapons (Mkutu 2008; Scheffran et al. 
2012; Greiner 2013). A market for the quick disposal of stock stimulated 
the influx of non-pastoralist actors into the cattle-rustling enterprise. 
Cattle theft was now inspired by the logic of localised “stock redistribu-
tion” among participating pastoralist communities, and the practice as-
sumed a translocational and transnational character (Alemika 2003; Okoli 
and Okpaleke 2014). Cattle rustling became a “predatory enterprise” 
(Fleisher 2002) with a “vent for surplus,” metamorphosing into highly 
commercialised and profit-oriented ventures (Manu et al. 2014; Greiner 
2013). Consequently, rustling became part of an organised criminal “un-
derworld franchise” (Kwaja 2014; Okoli and Okpaleke 2014).  
Pastoralism and Cattle Rustling in Nigeria 
The growing phenomenon of cattle rustling is one of transformation 
from the hitherto Fulani cultural practice of testing a person’s personal 
bravery and prowess at bloody warfare involving various groups and 
actors. This transformation has seen the emergence of well-coordinated 
and well-funded banditry in virtually every state in the northern area, 
with the Fulani ethnic group often considered at the epicentre of the 
scenario because of its deep involvement in pastoralism. However, 
herding livestock is not an exclusive preserve of Fulani; in Nigeria alone, 
14 other ethnic groups, including the Shuwa, Kanuri, Kanembu, Arabs, 
and Touareg, are in some way involved in it (Blench 2003). Fulani own 
approximately 90 per cent of the livestock and contribute about 3.2 per 
cent of the country’s GDP (Köster and de Wolff 2012). Fulani view 
cattle herding not necessarily as a delightful endeavour but as a profitable 
vocation that is taxing, strenuous, and exhausting. Thus, cattle serve 
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multiple purposes for them, including the provision of milk and beef, the 
opportunity to breed cattle and beautify stock, and as carriers and 
sources of income. In addition to being working capital, the cattle repre-
sent a social-security guarantee and inheritable assets for the herder’s 
family, particularly for his offspring. So central is the herd as pastoral cap-
ital that, aside from functioning as a means of production, storage, and 
transport, and a way to transfer food and wealth to the Fulani, its size 
indicates the social status of the individual or family and evokes an unspo-
ken dictum to strive to increase the herd. 
The pastoral system is patently both masculinised and youth-domin-
ated, with women relegated to the background and owning little stock. A 
woman with six cows is considered wealthy, while a male with 20 cows is 
seen as poor. A man’s lifelong ambition is governed by the aspiration to 
maintain healthy stock and increase his herd’s size to the best of his ability 
and by any means. Pastoralism as an economic enterprise is perceived as a 
prosperous vocation and, thus, mere possession of cattle singles Fulani out 
as affluent, thereby raising the prospect of predation from less-endowed 
individuals, communities, and rustling cartels (Olaniyan, Francis, and 
Okeke-Uzodike 2015). Consequently, Northern Nigeria has experienced 
an unrestrained escalation of cattle rustling, with maiming, raping, killing, 
and pillaging taking place in the process. 
Triggers of Cattle Rustling 
The current state of militarised cattle rustling represents a transformation 
from the erstwhile traditional practice of cattle raiding (Osamba 2000). 
Fulani have practised cattle raiding for many years as a cultural pattern of 
showing prowess and of restocking depleted stock. It is generally non-
militarised. However, the current spate of rustling is heavily militarised 
and deadly. A number of factors are attributable to this transformation. 
In the first instance, contemporary cattle-rustling activities operate as a 
form of organised crime, motivated by wealth accumulation given that 
proceeds are never subject to state taxation (Alemika 2013, Okoli and 
Okpaleke 2014). A major impetus for the syndicated criminality is the 
presence of what Chris Kwaja (2014) captured as the “underground econ-
omy,” which is linked to the political economy of some agrarian societies. 
An underground economy thrives on secrecy and the accumulation of 
untaxed wealth. In essence, the shadow economy in this case acts as an 
outlet for stolen cows and brings in a lot of cash.  
Some of the sources of funding for terrorists groups in Northern 
Nigeria have been linked to cattle rustling, too. As Governor Shetima of 
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Borno State claimed, a direct link between cattle rustling and Boko 
Haram insurgency has been established through intelligence reports. In 
his words:  
Our security agencies have reasonably established that most of the 
cattle being traded at the markets [in Borno State] were the direct 
proceeds of cattle-rustling perpetrated by insurgents [and] were 
sold at prohibitive costs to unsuspecting customers through some 
unscrupulous middlemen who use underhand ploy[s] to deliber-
ately disguise the transactions as legitimate. The money realised 
from such transaction[s] would then be channelled to fund their 
deadly activities (Ogbeche 2016). 
The discovery of this linkage prompted the governor to impose a ban on 
the sale of dried meat in the state. He also restricted the importation and 
sale of cattle to members of the Borno State branch of the Butchers and 
Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (Ogbeche 2016).  
In his analysis, which focused on the Horn of Africa, Markakis 
(1993) argued that cattle rustling is primarily the result of a “shrinking 
resource base” that has triggered an intense war of struggle for survival, 
which in turn poses serious threats to the existence of some groups. Just 
like a modern war, it is waged with the aid of sophisticated weapons. 
Our study discovers the involvement of cattle herders in the rustling 
business. A corollary to this development is the proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons across the country. The possession of these arms 
by non-state actors has set in motion chains of security challenges, one 
of which is the ability to organise armed syndicates to perpetrate cattle 
rustling. This situation is compounded by the inability of the Nigerian 
state to take control of the situation – evidence of increasing state weak-
ness (Kwaja 2014).  
Another trigger of the rustling business is the presence of large 
swathes of forest reserves that are generally out of the reach of the Ni-
gerian security operatives. Most of the rustling activities take place in 
state-owned reserves such as the Kamuku, Kiyanbana, and Fagore for-
ests in Northern Nigeria. The forests offer perfect locations for the crim-
inals to hide out from security forces. The reluctance of the Nigerian 
security operatives to enter these forest areas seems to be largely due to 
inefficiency, collaboration, and corruption. First, one major consequence 
of the lack of equipment and poor motivation of the Nigerian security 
forces is gross inefficiency. The Nigerian security operatives are ill 
equipped and ill motivated; in contrast, the criminals are well armed and 
motivated. Second, security forces and rustlers are often in cahoots. This 
seems obvious given the open manner of rustling and the reluctance of 
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the security operatives to act, even when provided with intelligence by 
local residents. A third issue is corruption. Y. Z. Ya’u, executive director of 
the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD), a 
non-governmental body funded by the MacArthur Foundation that is 
developing workable technological innovations against cattle rustling in 
Nigeria, stated: 
People steal hundreds of cattle, move them around for days and 
they don’t get apprehended, which means there is a problem with 
our security system. Secondly, if they can take them to our markets 
here in Nigeria and sell them off, it means there is not only a prob-
lem with our intelligence gathering system but also a form of col-
laboration with the dealers because the major cattle dealers in the 
markets ought to know if the cows are stolen. It illustrates that there 
is a wave of collaborations at various levels of cattle rustling and 
there is an obvious inability of the police and other security outfits 
to deal with the problem because firstly they are insufficiently 
equipped to be able to handle the challenge. Second, there is a form 
of collaboration between criminal elements and security agents and 
thirdly there is outright corruption. (National Express 2016) 
The conversion of forest reserves to locations of criminal activities and the 
ineffectiveness of the Nigerian security operatives has created ungoverned 
spaces. Theresa Whelan (2006: 64) conceptualised such ungoverned space 
as “a physical or non-physical area where there is an absence of state ca-
pacity or political will to exercise control.” She claimed that the physical 
refers to land and maritime areas, while the non-physical captures areas 
such as the financial space, utilised by criminal groups to transact money 
for nefarious activities. Such arguments suggest that the Nigerian forest 
reserves could turn into ungoverned spaces. By law, forest reservation as a 
means of conservation is itself “a sensitive social and political issue” 
(Areola 1987: 277) that the state employs deliberately to preserve forests 
for the benefits of humanity. Therefore, the forests are products of legality 
and ought to be properly secured. However, the increasing invasion and 
conversion of the forest spaces in Nigeria for criminal purposes has raised 
serious issues of security and the larger question of the widening of un-
governed spaces. Forest reserves are increasingly becoming bases for 
insurgents to launch attacks; hideouts for armed robbers who launch at-
tacks on travellers and traders; hideouts for thieves, criminals, and cattle 
rustlers; and bases for attacks on local people (Ladan 2014). The lack of 
government presence in these areas constitutes a trigger for criminal oper-
atives to operate with impunity. 
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State Response
The Nigerian government’s response to the security threat has been 
rather slow and generally reactive. It was only in 2014 that a concerted 
effort started to emerge. One such attempt involved the Nigerian Police 
Force, under Inspector-General Suleiman Abba, launching the Task Force 
on Cattle Rustling and Associated Crime. The task force was to be re-
sponsible for patrolling and operating in the context of intelligence gath-
ering on anti-rustling and related crimes, in addition to investigating and 
possibly prosecuting reported cases of such crimes (Yusuf 2015). How-
ever, the task force has been relatively inactive since its creation. By 
2015, some governors of northern states also started showing interest in 
the anti-rustling fight. Between July and October of that year, they held 
two meetings in which they agreed to pool their resources to fund a joint 
operation involving the military, the police, the state security service, and 
the Civil Defence Corps in order to comb the forests that are believed to 
be havens for cow thieves in the affected states (Binniyat 2015). How-
ever, the agreement resulted in more talk than action. Nonetheless, the 
initiative was effectively put into practice by the Niger State government 
when it established its own joint patrol, codenamed Operation Sharan 
Daji.1 The operation – which brings together the military, police, security 
service, civil defence corps, and local vigilante groups – works by pro-
actively engaging with the rustlers in the forests. Within a week of its 
establishment, a total of 118 cows and 23 sheep had been recovered 
from rustlers (Channels TV 2016). The same method of joint patrol oper-
ation was also put in place by the Katsina State government in late 2015. 
However, the most innovative response came from the Kaduna 
State government. The steps include embedding security agents amongst 
herders to protect them against armed rustlers; tightening state borders 
to prevent transborder influx of rustlers; and, most importantly, im-
planting computer microchips in the animals to monitor their move-
ments and prevent armed bandits from stealing them (Jimoh 2015). The 
Kaduna initiative, termed the “El-Rufai Model,” represents a proactive 
and pre-emptive approach by the use of information and communication 
technology (ICT) (Leadership 2015). However, it remains a proposal, and 
nobody knows when it will be implemented. 
Nevertheless, state actions have reduced the incidence of cattle rus-
tling in recent times. On several occasions, thousands of cattle have been 
recovered and returned to owners. For example, as of 7 March 2016, the 
1  Sharan daji means “clear up” in Hausa. 
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joint patrol team put in place by the Katsina government had recovered 
12,000 cattle within a few days of operation (Elazeh 2016). In addition, a 
number of rustlers have been arrested and prosecuted. The security 
forces have also been able to invade some of the rustlers’ hideouts, with 
the aid of the military forces. Despite such gains, the cow-rustling men-
ace is far from eradicated. The clash between cattle herders and members 
of the Agatu ethnic group in Benue State on 10 March 2016 resulted in 
the death of an estimated 300 people linked to accusations of cattle rus-
tling (Godwin 2016).  
Conclusion 
Cattle rustling has emerged as a major security challenge in Nigeria. As a 
criminal enterprise it has consequences for the socio-economic, political, 
cultural, and psychological spheres of society. At the economic level, it 
constitutes a major threat to the livelihood of herders and those who 
depend on cows for survival. At the socio-political level, rustlers’ ac-
tivities have resulted in death, loss, and the destruction of lives and prop-
erty, thereby disturbing peace and security. Therefore, the Nigerian gov-
ernment is expending major resources to eradicate rustling. At the psy-
chological level, a vast number of people have been disposed of their 
belongings, and families have been traumatised; there have been reported 
cases of rape and kidnapping, which has caused psychological trauma.  
It is important for the government to deploy security personnel to 
the forests that serve as hideouts for the marauders. The forests must be 
governed and the illegal users must be dislodged and permanently pre-
vented from controlling the spaces. In addition, the security forces must 
strengthen the intelligence-gathering system, with support from the local 
population. Also, the Butchers and Cattle Breeders Association of 
Nigeria must be involved in the fight. They are in a better position to 
identify rustled cows when they are brought to the market. The most 
important strategy is the use of technology, as initiated by the 
government of Kaduna State. The use of computer microchips will 
determine the location of the animals and the herders and enable 
tracking by the security forces.  
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Rinder, Banditen und Gewalt: Viehdiebstahl in Nordnigeria 
Zusammenfassung: In jüngster Zeit hat sich der Viehraub in Nigeria zu 
einer bedrohlichen Form der Kriminalität entwickelt; der Norden ist am 
stärksten betroffen. Viehdiebstähle haben in den vergangenen Jahren zum 
Raub zahlreicher Rinder, zum Tod von Menschen und zu massiver Zer-
störung von Eigentum geführt. Tägliche Berichte über entsprechende Er-
eignisse im Norden Nigerias bestätigen, dass der Viehdiebstahl inzwischen 
erheblich zu den wachsenden Sicherheitsproblemen des Landes beiträgt. 
Er ist zu einem großen Geschäft geworden, an dem Viehhalter, große Syn-
dikate und schwerbewaffnete Banditen beteiligt sind. Trotz des zuneh-
menden Umfangs der Raubzüge und ihrer gesellschaftlichen Folgen wird 
diese Situation bislang nicht angemessen wissenschaftlich erforscht. Der 
vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich den Ursachen und Folgen des Viehdieb-
stahls in Nigeria und zeigt Reaktionen des Staates auf. 
Schlagwörter: Nigeria, Viehwirtschaft, Rinder, Gewaltverbrechen, Orga-
nisierte Kriminalität 
